B.Mirror Desk: Amidst long-standing allegations of irregularities and corruption surrounding the transfer and posting of government officials, the decision to introduce a lottery system for the transfer of Sub-Registrars—a first of its kind—is undoubtedly an exceptional initiative. If successful, this measure, aimed at ensuring transparency, could set a precedent for eliminating the “transfer trade” within the government administration.
The Ministry of Law recently announced in a press release that a decision has been made to conduct postings via lottery to bring transparency to the transfer process for Sub-Registrars. The lottery is scheduled to take place at the Ministry of Law’s conference room. Sub-Registrars currently serving in various districts across the country will be transferred to designated posts in Sub-Registry offices within Dhaka district through this lottery process. The proceedings are set to be conducted in the presence of the Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Md. Anisul Huq.
Allegations of corruption regarding transfers and postings in Bangladesh’s government service are nothing new. In particular, there have long been accusations of bribery involving key positions in various land-related government departments; the post of Sub-Registrar is no exception. It is alleged that unethical financial dealings are employed to secure postings in certain important and financially lucrative areas. Consequently, if an official spends a large sum of money to obtain a position, there is a risk that they will feel compelled to recoup that amount after assuming office. This directly impacts the general public.
This culture of “transfer trade” is not limited to Sub-Registry offices alone. Allegations of irregularities exist across various levels of the government administration regarding postings to preferred locations, key positions, or financially advantageous areas. Media reports have previously highlighted instances of massive financial transactions surrounding specific posts and workplaces. When an official assumes a position by spending money, a mindset of recovering that investment often develops, potentially strengthening the cycle of corruption.
Similar allegations have also been raised regarding postings at various levels within law enforcement agencies. Allegations of large sums of money changing hands to secure key positions in police stations—particularly in important and upscale areas—have surfaced in the past. Such allegations are not limited to senior roles; reports of financial transactions regarding postings at lower levels also circulate. If these allegations are true, a critical question arises: if an officer or employee pays a bribe to secure a position, how honestly and impartially can they perform their duties once in office?
Allegations of irregularities regarding the transfer and posting of lower-court judges have also arisen from time to time. If financial transactions influence transfers and postings within a vital institution like the judiciary, it can undermine public confidence in the entire justice system.
Controversies surrounding postings and promotions also emerged during the tenure of the interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Allegations surfaced regarding open bribery for secretary-level postings and promotions. At the same time, there was widespread discussion concerning irregularities and financial dealings in the appointment of Deputy Commissioners (DCs). Various allegations and sensational details regarding key administrative postings were reported in the media during that period. These incidents indicate that the culture of irregularity surrounding transfers, postings, and promotions did not easily disappear, even after a change in government.
For a long time, there have been allegations of irregularities and financial transactions involving key positions in various government bodies, such as the Forest Department, the Public Works Department, the Roads and Highways Department, and the Local Government Engineering Department. Certain districts or specific work locations are often perceived as more desirable, sparking competition among officials to secure these posts. It is alleged that a culture of unethical transactions has developed by exploiting this competition. Reports of massive sums of money changing hands for high-level positions have also surfaced in the past.
Allegations of a “trade” in postings also exist within the medical profession. There have long been complaints that doctors must pay up to hundreds of thousands of taka to secure a transfer to Dhaka. Many doctors are reluctant to work outside the capital. A major reason for this is the excessive concentration of the country’s administrative, economic, and social systems around Dhaka. Consequently, a desire to reside in the capital has emerged, leading to allegations of various forms of lobbying and financial transactions to secure transfers to desired postings.
The mass transfer of doctors and staff within the Directorate General of Health Services during the Yunus era also became a topic of discussion. Reports indicate that 3,000 medical officers and 500 staff members were reassigned. It was widely discussed in relevant circles that the Directorate had never before witnessed such large-scale transfers within such a short period.
There are allegations that many transferred doctors have failed to join their new posts at the district and upazila levels. This raises concerns that the manpower shortage in healthcare services in remote and upazila areas could become even more acute.
It is a reality that a large number of government employees prefer to work in the capital. However, in a country of 180 million people, if everyone wants to work in Dhaka, how will the vast population outside the capital access government services? This Dhaka-centric tendency is evident across almost all sectors—including healthcare, administration, law enforcement, land management, and engineering—and the current system of transfers and postings plays a significant role in this.
Against this backdrop, the decision to introduce a lottery system for the transfer of Sub-Registrars can be viewed as a significant administrative reform. Its greatest advantage is that it minimizes the scope for personal influence, lobbying, or financial transactions in determining where an official is posted. Assigning posts via lottery from a pre-approved list of qualified officials enhances transparency in the transfer process and reduces the likelihood of irregularities.
However, one cannot assume that merely introducing a lottery will completely eliminate corruption. Alongside the lottery, factors such as an official’s qualifications, competence, discipline, the specific needs of the workplace, and the tenure of service must also be taken into account. Furthermore, it is essential that the entire lottery process be transparent, technology-driven, and auditable; this would further increase the initiative’s acceptability.
If this method proves successful for Sub-Registrars, its application to other key government positions could be considered. For instance, regarding the appointment of Deputy Commissioners, a transparent “fit list” of officials meeting the required criteria could be created, and their postings determined via lottery based on established policies. Similarly, transparent and automated systems could be implemented for the transfer and posting of Officers-in-Charge (OCs) at police stations or for doctors, as the need arises.
When an official assumes a position without resorting to bribery or lobbying, a sense of moral obligation regarding the discharge of their duties is instilled in them. One would not expect an official to harbor the intent of recouping the cost of securing a position once appointed. Rather, the natural expectation is that they would strive to retain their post through competence, integrity, and a commitment to the public.
Therefore, the initiative to introduce a lottery system for the transfer of sub-registrars should not be viewed merely as a procedural change. It has the potential to establish transparency within the civil administration and pioneer a new approach to combating the “transfer trade.” Should the government wish, it could evaluate the outcome of this initiative and consider implementing similar effective measures across other ministries and public institutions.
It is difficult to curb corruption solely through legislation or the threat of punishment; the structural weaknesses that create opportunities for corruption must also be addressed. If transfers and postings constitute a significant area of ​​such vulnerability, then initiatives to ensure transparency in this process are undoubtedly crucial.
Thus, the lottery-based transfer system for sub-registrars represents a promising beginning. If implemented correctly and evaluated regularly, it could play a positive role in curbing the “transfer trade” in government service while simultaneously enhancing accountability, impartiality, and the quality of public service within the administration.